The Inevitability of Allied Victory in Europe During World War Two free essay sample

However Allied victory eventually did become inevitable after certain turning points in the war, this essay will demonstrate how the two most important turning points, the Battle for Stalingrad and the entry of the USA into the war changed a possible German victory into an inevitable Allied victory. In essence this essay will show that the idea of total war and industrial gigantism do not guarantee victory in conflict. One must also ask themselves why Germany would have such a drive for war if Allied victory was conceived to be inevitable. After all what soldier would fight the unwinnable battle? Richard Overy states in Why the Allies Won that ‘no rational man in early 1942 would have guessed at the eventual outcome of the war’ . To appreciate the credibility of this statement and the probability of German victory, the early years of the war must be looked at retrospectively, and Germany’s position tactically, economically and socially must be analysed. Even though Germany was out-matched in production and numbers there is no reason to believe that the early years of the war pointed to inevitable Allied victory.WW2 in Europe was precipitated by many contributing factors. Widely accepted though is the idea that most Germans were resentful of the humiliating defeat in WW1 which in following, Germany was forced to sign the treaty of Versailles. Economic disaster ensued due to the large reparations the victors demanded. Thus it is not surprising that upon the Nazi Parties rise the German people immediately aggrandised Hitler, a wounded Linz Regiment corporal from the First World War who promised a mannish dream of another German Empire. Re-armament of Germany was soon to follow, in spite of the treaty’s prohibition of this, and a highly trained, equipped and motivated military war machine was built. Stats At this point Germany had 195 divisions 28 of which were elite armoured or panzer divisions, key elements in the army’s ability to fight a Blitzkrieg war. Hitler then moved to annex Austria and Czechoslovakia which he succeeded in doing while avoiding any conflict. Germany’s next move was to take Poland after signing a non-aggression treaty with Russia.Poland’s antiquated army fell in one month. The early years of the war saw the German war machine make crushing blows in Europe. Hitler’s blitzkrieg was ruthless and stunning to his enemies who found themselves caught in its path or more often cut off by its encircling tactics. After the fall of Poland the German Army turned south and fought a Blitzkrieg war through the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg and France. At this point Germany was undoubtedly tactically superior to every other nation on Earth. ‘The German Army had fought an amazing campaign.It had shown itself almost incomparable in defence as well as in offence’ It was positioned to take Britain and the Soviet Union. Hitler had assessed the French and British as weak. Although this assessment certainly was not representative of the courage and fortitude of the nations and even their military size it was however an accurate depiction of their readiness and tactical ability. France was ready having placed its army at the Maginot line to fight a war of attrition, however Germany on the other hand was not ready to fight a war of attrition and indeed would not. Using blitzkrieg and paratroopers the German Army encircled the Maginot Line, defeating the defenders and pushing the British Expeditionary Force out to sea at Dunkirk. Early in the war Germany’s economic might was very large but still not comparable to the allies. However this does not necessarily mean that defeat was an inevitable outcome. Hitler’s predictions of the German economic standing globally before the war would likely have given him a false illusion of Germans economic might.The statistics gathered caused him not to assess the USA or Russia as the potential superpowers or industrial giants they were to become, and rightly so. In 1936 America’s army was 110,000 men strong, its military spending was 1% of its annual budget and it had no independent air force and an unarmed navy The prediction was made that either country would not be able to mobilise an effective industry compared to Germany’s inside a four year time limit So is it reasonable to say that even economically Germany was facing a potential victory even though so many say this war was won by economics and economics alone?Not only did Germany have an impressive production capability already but it was sitting very close to potentially enormous deposits of resources, most notably the oil in The caucuses south of Rostov and Stalingrad. In 1941 German production of crude oil was 33. 4 million tons compared to Russia’s 110 million tons. Now at this stage in the war the USA was still not involved so German commitments even though on two fronts were only faced with a large pressure from Russia on the Eastern front.Certainly if Germany had taken the caucuses and their invaluable oil Russia would have been crippled and defeated? But also Germany would be standing in a much better economic position. Having developed an idea of Germany’s capability economically and tactically and proven that Allied victory at that stage was not inevitable it is now time to look at the turning points and why the German position became impossible. The summer of 1941 saw the war move east as the German army opened up an attack on the Soviet Union. Code named ‘Operation Barbarossa’ the attack achieved complete surprise.Stalin actually had to be convinced that the German army was attacking as he held faith in the non-aggression pact between the two countries. The war moved with incredible speed and with huge pincer movements that captured, killed and wounded whole Russian army groups. After making deep penetrations into Russia Hitler inexplicably ordered a halt on the advance before reaching Moscow and the momentum of the attack was lost. It was not until winter had passed and the warmer weather arrived in April 1942 that Hitler moved to take the initiative again.At this time Russian reconnaissance noticed â€Å"Germans were concentrating their forces on the southern part of the Central Front’. Hitler’s plan was to move south with the 6th Army and the 4th Panzer Army and take first Rostov and then Stalingrad which would have effectively cut off the caucuses and Russian oil – some 110 million tons of it . This manoeuvre in itself could have ended the war for the Russians. Without the caucuses and its oil it would have been impossible to mobilise the reserve divisions that hadn’t been decimated in 1941 during B arbarossa. Ultimately soviet defeat would have allowed Hitler to return his full attention to Britain and invading her. Some may argue that German defeat was always inevitable because of the eventual involvement of the USA. However the involvement of the USA would never have occurred if Britain fell. â€Å"Had the British opted for a negotiated peace or succumbed to invasion the USA would have retreated behind the walls of a ‘fortress’ America’ This was an entirely possible scenario if Stalingrad and the caucuses had been taken .This operation in essence would be a defining point of the war, but was the loss at Stalingrad inevitable and thus leading to inevitable Allied victory? Firstly the circumstances must be looked at. Hitler’s plan was to drive the 4th Panzer division directly south to Rostov, however he overestimated Rostov’s ability to hold and stripped the 6th Army of its armour and fuel as support for the 4th. Rostov was poorly defended and captured r elative ease. At the same time though Hitler ordered the 6th Army to march on to Stalingrad.This became a fatal decision. The 6th army was weakened and had been marching for 6 weeks. A sensible strategist would have halted the 6th and allowed its armour and elements of the 4th Panzer Army to link up. Strangely this seemingly simple idea that would have resulted in a much more decisive and strengthened force arriving at Stalingrad was not implemented and the 6th army was forced to fight in extremely unfavourable circumstances. Hence Germany unable to deliver the knockout blow to take Russia out of the war.They had involved their most experienced troops in a conflict which resulted in huge casualties and losses, meaning any attack on the western front would further stretch the German armed forces. And all the while they had failed to destroy the Soviet economy, which by the end of ‘41 had put itself on a war footing, one which Germany was never able to achieve. Following Stalingrad the German Army suffered massive defeats on the entire Eastern Front until finally they could fight no longer.Thus the turning point in the war was reached and the fate of the war seems to have been decided by Hitler’s compulsion and hasty decisions rather than the ability of the German army to fight. Because of Hitler’s loss at Stalingrad and his failure to capture the all important caucus oil as well as the destruction of the finest parts of his army an invasion in the West was now not only possible but imminent. The invasion came in in the form of the US army at Normandy.The Western front became a devastating arena for the Germans but was only so devastating due to the effects of the German losses on the Eastern front. Even though Hitler ordered his reserves to concentrate on defending the Western front, it was still now an inevitable outcome that the allies would be victorious. Even the Battle of the Bulge had little hope of long term success as the allies were transporting more supplies on to mainland Europe every day, at a rate Germany could not hope to match. By 1945 the Russian army had made it to Berlin and the war was over.In conclusion Allied victory in Europe only became inevitable after the turning points of Stalingrad and the US invasion. Hitler made a fatal and unforgivable mistake by not ensuring the Soviet Union was completely destroyed in Operation Barbarossa. If the invasion had been successful, an Allied invasion of Western Europe would have been close to impossible. Overall Allied victory was not inevitable but sat on a precarious balance that fortunately tipped in the favour of good rather than that of evil. 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